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The Effects of Partial Employment 




(with Sabrina Di Addario and Diego Daruich)
Concerns over labor market flexibility have been at the 
center of the European political debate for the past three 
decades (see, e.g., Nickell [1997]). In response to the wide-
spread belief that rigid employment protection laws (EPLs) 
depress employment, many countries—including France, 
Spain, and Italy—undertook reforms that substantially 
relaxed legal constraints on the use of temporary employ-
ment contracts. Importantly, however, these reforms were 
often only partial in that the degree of employment protec-
tion granted to workers hired via permanent employment 
contracts remained unchanged.
Economic theory delivers ambiguous predictions on the 
effects of such partial reforms of EPL. Several studies have 
noted that such reforms in principle could generate higher 
overall employment and improved labor market efficiency, 
or alternatively they could lead to a substitution of perma-
nent contracts with rotating temporary contracts and little or 
no net gain in employment (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; 
Blanchard and Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002). 
Some studies even suggest that partial reforms could end 
up increasing the bargaining power of incumbent workers, 
usually hired via permanent contracts, thus enhancing the 
“insider-outsider” gap (Bentolila and Dolado 1994).
Empirical assessments of these policy changes have 
mainly used cross-country research designs with aggregate 
data (Bertola 1990; Garibaldi and Violante 2005; Lazear 
1990). A few recent studies have conducted within-country 
before-and-after studies, focusing on firm-level aggregates 
(e.g., Autor, Kerr, and Kugler 2007; Cappellari, Dell’Aringa, 
and Leonardi 2012). While informative, an analysis of firm 
aggregates cannot directly address the effect of the reforms 
on job duration or on the rate of transition between tempo-
rary and permanent contracts, both of which are crucial to 
understanding the full impact of these institutional changes 
(Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet 2016; Güell and Petrongolo 
2007). A firm-level analysis also ignores any distributional 
impact arising from the differential treatment of the reform 
on new versus incumbent workers (Boeri 2011).
In this dissertation, my coauthors, Sabrina Di Addario 
and Diego Daruich, and I use detailed Italian social security 
records matched with firm financial data and a difference- 
in-differences research design to provide a comprehensive 
empirical evaluation of an Italian reform signed into law in 
2001. This reform facilitated the usage of temporary con-
tracts, while maintaining existing employment protections 
for workers with permanent contracts.
Longitudinal data on jobs, firms, and workers permit us 
to answer three fundamental questions on the impact of this 
policy change: 1) How did the reform affect overall employ-
ment and labor income? 2) What factors contributed to the 
success or failure of the law in raising employment and earn-
ings? 3) Were there heterogeneous effects across different 
worker and firm groups?
In Chapters 1 and 2 of the dissertation we find that, con-
trary to the stated intent of the law (Biagi and Sacconi 2001), 
the reform had little or no effect on aggregate employment 
and led to a decline in average earnings. We explain these 
results by showing that after the reform the Italian labor 
market became increasingly segmented: more workers were 
trapped in cycles of low-paid and fragile temporary jobs 
where the likelihood of transitioning from temporary to per-
manent jobs fell substantially. On the other hand, consistent 
with the intention of the law, average firm labor costs fell 
and mapped into significant increases in profits. The reform 
generated both winners and losers: its primary beneficiaries 
were firms, their shareholders and managers, as well as older 
incumbent workers. By contrast, the earnings of younger 
workers and new entrants were substantially depressed fol-
lowing the policy change, and this widened the intercohort  
gaps among Italian workers (Naticchioni, Raitano, and 
Vittori 2016). Chapter 3 shows that a potential mechanism to 
explain these distributional impacts is the large difference in 
bargaining power between temporary contract workers and 
permanent ones.
The policy evaluation conducted in Chapters 1 and 2 of 
this dissertation builds on the work of Cappellari, Dell’Ar-
inga, and Leonardi (2012) and exploits the staggered imple-
mentation of the reform across different collective bargain-
ing agreements (Contratti Collettivi Nazionali del Lavoro; 
CCNL henceforth). While Cappellari et al. rely on eight 
CCNLs and survey information on firms’ sector to infer the 
passage of the reform, we exploit the fact that Italian social 
security records directly report each worker’s CCNL. These 
unique data allow us to account for the fact that firms can 
hire employees covered by different CCNLs (Card, Devici-
enti, and Maida 2014; Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida 2016). 
We combine this information with novel data on the renewals 
of 121 Italian collective bargaining agreements to infer the 
reform status for over 50 million person-year observations, 
which are subsequently matched with the universe of finan-
cial records of Italian limited liability companies. We show 
that outcomes follow parallel trends prior to the implementa-
tion of the reform, indicating that observations from CCNLs 
yet to be reformed can be used to gauge counterfactual out-
comes for observations in reformed CCNLs in the absence 
of the reform. Relatedly, we show that there is relatively 
little endogenous sorting of workers across different CCNLs 
in response to the reform, and that the composition of new 
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entrants before and after the policy change is well balanced 
across a large set of observable individual characteristics.
To guide our empirical analysis, in Chapter 1 we develop 
a search and matching model based on Cahuc, Charlot, and 
Malherbet (2016) that captures the dynamic incentives of 
reforms to employment protection. The model suggests that 
partial EPL reforms can generate both intended and unin-
tended consequences. The latter are driven by the increase in 
the turnover of temporary jobs, as this type of policy change 
reduces incentives to sign longer temporary contracts as well 
as to convert workers originally hired under a temporary 
contract to a permanent position. Quantifying the extent of 
both intended and unintended consequences and their overall 
impact on workers and firms is the objective of our empirical 
analysis.
Chapter 1 presents the effects of the reform on jobs. We 
find that, consistent with the intended consequences of the 
law, the reform fostered job creation and increased the share 
of new jobs signed under a temporary contract. Offsetting 
this rise in job creation, however, we find that the rate of 
separation for workers hired under a temporary contract 
increased after the reform. This change was primarily driven 
by decreases in the probability that a temporary contract is 
renewed and mapped into significant increases in the transi-
tion rate from a temporary contract in one year to non- 
employment in the next year. We also find that, after the 
reform, most new jobs were filled by workers who came 
directly from another job (i.e., a job-to-job transition) rather 
than by workers coming from nonemployment. Looking 
more closely at the jobs themselves, we find that, after the 
passage of the reform, the total number of days worked 
under a temporary contract decreased by approximately 5 
percent. This effect resulted in an increase in the difference 
in earnings between permanent and temporary contract of 
around 10 percent following the reform. 
Chapter 2 describes the impact of the reform on firms 
and workers. Starting with firms, we find that firm profit 
margins, defined as profits divided by value added, increased 
following the policy change by approximately 5 percent. 
This increase in profits stemmed primarily from a decrease 
in labor costs per worker rather than increases in value 
added. Indeed, we estimate that the average gap in annual 
labor costs between temporary and permanent workers to 
be approximately 16,500 euros. Average firm size did not 
change significantly after the reform, suggesting that firms 
primarily substituted permanent positions with temporary 
ones, although there is some indication that this change led 
to a decrease in value added. This highlights a trade-off 
between lower labor costs and lower productivity in firms’ 
decisions to utilize temporary contracts (Weil 2014).
The decrease in labor costs and increased utilization of 
temporary contracts is also associated with a rise in with-
in-firm earnings inequality. We find that the reform raised 
the within-firm standard deviation of earnings by approxi-
mately 4 percent. Moreover, the within-firm pay gap between 
young and older workers also increased by 4.5 percent. 
Interestingly, the overall wage bill paid to managers and 
their average compensation both increase after the reform. 
This suggests that the increase in profits following the policy 
change may have been partially redistributed to managers.
Chapter 2 then presents estimates of the impacts of the 
reform on workers. We find that the reform has close to null 
effect on the probability to be employed, which is consistent 
with our theoretical framework and the previously described 
effects of the policy on the dynamics of job destruction and 
creation. On average, however, workers earned less after the 
reform, with a substantial rise in the pay gap between incum-
bent permanent workers, who had higher earnings following 
the reform, and incumbent temporary workers, who suffered 
an average earnings loss of up to 5 percent following the 
policy change. These losses are primarily driven to decreases 
in the probability that incumbent temporary workers were 
converted to permanent contracts by their employers after the 
reform.
Longitudinal data on workers permit us to isolate the 
dynamic effects of the reform on new entrants. Young indi-
viduals who entered the labor market after the reform earned 
between 3.5 and 7 percent less in the first year of entry 
compared to those who had entered in the prereform regime. 
These estimates persisted up to the seventh year follow-
ing entry in the labor market and mapped into cumulative 
present discounted value losses ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 
euros, depending on the cohort analyzed. We show that these 
negative estimates were not due to compositional changes 
or selective entry of workers based on the reform status. 
Instead, postreform-entering cohorts were disproportionately 
more likely to be “trapped” during their careers in temporary 
jobs where firms had possibly fewer incentives to provide 
on-the-job training (Cabrales, Dolado, and Mora 2014).
In the last chapter of the dissertation, we abstract from the 
effect of the reform and focus on the economic forces behind 
the substantial gap in daily wages between permanent and 
temporary workers. Informed by our results on within-firm 
inequality and by the large underrepresentation of temporary 
contract workers within unions (Bentolila and Dolado 1994; 
Lani 2013), we concentrate on the role of employers’ pay 
policies in generating a contract wage gap (Card, Cardoso, 
and Kline 2016). Exploiting within-person daily wage 
changes for workers who transitioned from a temporary to a 
permanent contract within the same employer, we find that 
temporary workers received only 66 percent of the rents tra-
ditionally shared by firms with permanent workers. This dif-
ference in rent sharing explains 75 percent of the raw wage 
return when transitioning from a temporary to a permanent 
contract within the same employer.
This dissertation contributes to the following strands of 
the literature. Our analysis of firms provides new evidence 
on the role of employment protection in the performance of 
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firms (Autor, Kerr, and Kugler 2007; Cappellari, Dell’Ar-
inga, and Leonardi 2012; Cingano et al. 2016), a relationship 
characterized by mixed empirical results that has received 
a considerable amount of theoretical attention (Boeri and 
Garibaldi 2007; Lagos 2006). We also establish a previ-
ously unexplored link between institutional reforms aimed 
at facilitating the creation of temporary work arrangements 
and increases in within-firm inequality (Card, Cardoso, and 
Klein 2013; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Song et al., 
forthcoming).
Our analysis of job flows in Chapter 1 provides new qua-
si-experimental evidence of the role of labor market flexibil-
ity and temporary contracts in the dynamics of job creation 
and destruction. This relationship has typically been studied 
by either comparing cross-country aggregates (Bassanini and 
Marianna 2009; Bertola 1990; Bertola and Rogerson 1997; 
Boeri 1999) or relying on individual data based on surveys 
combined with selection on observable techniques (Bover 
and Gómez 2004; Gagliarducci 2005; Güell and Petrongolo 
2007; Picchio 2008). Focusing on individual transitions 
across employers and employment contracts permits us to 
decompose the responses of job creation and destruction to 
the policy change. Moreover, we can also test crucial pre-
dictions from our model, such as the negative impact of the 
reform on the likelihood of converting temporary contracts 
to permanent ones. We also document how partial reforms 
targeting only the employment protection of temporary con-
tracts map into a widening of the duality in key labor market 
outcomes across employment contracts. These findings 
connect to an older literature that examines the existence 
and consequences of dual labor markets (Dickens and Lang 
1985; Rebitzer and Taylor 1991).
The worker-level analysis of Chapter 2 contributes to the 
literature that examines the impact of partial labor market 
reforms on individual outcomes (see Boeri [2011] for a 
review). We highlight the distributional impacts of these 
reforms across different individuals. We also provide new 
insights into the question of whether temporary contracts 
represent stepping stones into the labor market or a trap that 
hinders the development of the career of young workers, a 
question characterized by mixed empirical evidence (Autor 
and Houseman 2010; Blanchard and Landier 2002; Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank 2002; Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 
2008). Our examination of the consequences of entering the 
labor market under the new policy regime connects to studies 
that analyze how entry conditions affect short- and long-term 
earnings (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 
2012) and is related to recent work of García-Pérez, Castelló, 
and Marinescu (2016), who study a reform similar to the one 
analyzed here for Spanish male high school dropouts.
Finally, Chapter 3 provides new evidence for the exis-
tence of a permanent contract premium in wages (Kahn 
2016) using an event-study design that zooms into the 
within-person, within-employer return of transitioning from 
a temporary to a permanent contract. We show that a major 
explanation for the large return associated with this transition 
is that firm-specific rents are not distributed equally between 
temporary and permanent workers within the same firm. This 
last finding contributes to a nascent literature that shows 
how firms are increasingly redrawing their boundaries, often 
by making use of alternative types of work arrangements, 
such as temporary employment contracts, in an attempt to 
limit the degree of rent sharing to a group of core employees 
(Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017; Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1986; Katz and Krueger 2016; Weil 2014;).
References
Autor, David H., William Revill Kerr, and Adriana D. Kugler. 2007. 
“Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence 
from US States.”	Economic	Journal 117(521): 189–217. 
Autor, David H., and Susan N. Houseman. 2010. “Do Tempo-
rary-Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled 
Workers? Evidence from ‘Work First.’” American	Economic	
Journal:	Applied	Economics 2(3): 96–128.
Bassanini, Andrea, and Pascal Marianna. 2009. “Looking Inside 
the Perpetual-Motion Machine: Job and Worker Flows in OECD 
Countries.” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Paper No. 95. Paris: OECD.
Bentolila, Samuel, and Juan J. Dolado. 1994. “Labour Flexibility 
and Wages: Lessons from Spain.” Economic	Policy 9(18): 53–99.
Bentolila, Samuel, and Gilles Saint-Paul. 1992. “The Macroeco-
nomic Impact of Flexible Labor Contracts, with an Application to 
Spain.” European	Economic	Review	36(5): 1013–1047.
Bertola, Giuseppe. 1990. “Job Security, Employment and Wages.” 
European	Economic	Review 34(4): 851–879.
Bertola, Giuseppe, and Richard Rogerson. 1997. “Institutions 
and Labor Reallocation.” European	Economic	Review 41(6): 
1147–1171.
Biagi, M. and M. Sacconi. 2001. Libro	Bianco	sul	Mercato	del	
Lavoro	in	Italia. Technical report. Rome: Ministero Italiano del 
Lavoro.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Augustin Landier. 2002. “The Perverse 
Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: Fixed-Term Contracts 
in France.” Economic	Journal 112(480): F214–F244.
Boeri, Tito. 1999. “Enforcement of Employment Security Regula-
tions, On-the-Job Search and Unemployment Duration.” Euro-
pean	Economic	Review 43(1): 65–89.
———. 2011. Institutional	Reforms	and	Dualism	in	European	
Labor	Markets, Vol. 122. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier.
Boeri, Tito, and Pietro Garibaldi. 2007. “Two Tier Reforms of 
Employment Protection: A Honeymoon Effect?” Economic	Jour-
nal	117(521): F357–F385.
Booth, Alison L., Marco Francesconi, and Jeff Frank. 2002. “Tem-
porary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?” Economic	Journal 
112(480): F189–F213.
Bover, Olympia, and Ramón Gómez. 2004. “Another Look at 
Unemployment Duration: Exit to a Permanent vs. a Temporary 
Job.” Investigaciones	Económicas 28(2): 285–314.
Cabrales, Antonio, Juan J. Dolado, and Ricardo Mora. 2014. 
“Dual Labour Markets and (Lack of) On-the-Job Training: Piaac 
Evidence from Spain and Other EU Countries.” CEPR Discus-
sion Paper No. DP 10246. London: Center for Economic Policy 
Research. 
Cahuc, Pierre, Olivier Charlot, and Franck Malherbet. 2016. 
“Explaining the Spread of Temporary Jobs and Its Impact 
on Labor Turnover.” International	Economic	Review 57(2): 
533–572.
Cahuc, Pierre, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2002. “Temporary Jobs, 
Employment Protection and Labor Market Performance.” Labour	
Economics 9(1): 63–91.
Cappellari, Lorenzo, Carlo Dell’Aringa, and Marco Leonardi. 2012. 
“Temporary Employment, Job Flows and Productivity: A Tale of 
Two Reforms.” Economic	Journal 122(562): F188–F215.
Card, David, Ana Rute Cardoso, and Patrick Kline. 2016. “Bargain-
ing, Sorting, and the Gender Wage Gap: Quantifying the Impact 
of Firms on the Relative Pay of Women.” Quarterly	Journal	of	
Economics 131(2): 633–686.
Card, David, Francesco Devicienti, and Agata Maida. 2014. 
“Rent-Sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched 
Panel Data.” Review	of	Economic	Studies 81(1): 84–111.
Card, David, Jörg Heining, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Workplace 
Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality.” 
Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics 128(3): 967–1015.
Cingano, Federico, Marco Leonardi, Julián Messina, and Giovanni 
Pica. 2016. “Employment Protection Legislation, Capital Invest-
ment and Access to Credit: Evidence from Italy.” Economic	
Journal 126(595): 1798–1822.
Devicienti, Francesco, Bernardo Fanfani, and Agata Maida. 2016. 
“Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in 
Italy.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10293. Bonn: Institute of Labor 
Economics. 
Dickens, William T., and Kevin Lang. 1985. “A Test of Dual Labor 
Market Theory.” American	Economic	Review 75(4): 792–805.
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. 
“Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 
1973–1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 64(5): 
1001–1044.
Gagliarducci, Stefano. 2005. “The Dynamics of Repeated Tempo-
rary Jobs.” Labour	Economics 12(4): 429–448.
García-Pérez, J. Ignacio, Judit Vall Castell´o, and Ioana Marinescu. 
2016. Can	Fixed-Term	Contracts	Put	Low-Skilled	Youth	on	a	
Better	Career	Path?	Evidence	from	Spain. Technical report. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Garibaldi, Pietro, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2005. “The Employ-
ment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities.” 
Economic	Journal 115(506): 799–832.
Goldschmidt, Deborah, and Johannes F. Schmieder. 2017. “The 
Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the Ger-
man Wage Structure.” Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics 132(3): 
1165–1217. 
Güell, Maia, and Barbara Petrongolo. 2007. “How Binding Are 
Legal Limits? Transitions from Temporary to Permanent Work in 
Spain.” Labour	Economics 14(2): 153–183.
Ichino, Andrea, Fabrizia Mealli, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2008. 
“From Temporary Help Jobs to Permanent Employment: What 
Can We Learn from Matching Estimators and Their Sensitivity?” 
Journal	of	Applied	Econometrics 23(3): 305–327.
Kahn, Lawrence M. 2016. “The Structure of the Permanent Job 
Wage Premium: Evidence from Europe.” Industrial	Relations:	A	
Journal	of	Economy	and	Society 55(1): 149–178. 
Kahn, Lisa B. 2010. “The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences 
of Graduating from College in a Bad Economy.” Labour	Eco-
nomics 17(2): 303–316.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. 1986. 
“Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the 
Market.” American	Economic	Review 76(4): 728–741.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Alan B. Krueger. 2016.	The	Rise	and	
Nature	of	Alternative	Work	Arrangements	in	the	United	States,	
1995–2015. Technical report. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research.
Lagos, Ricardo. 2006. “A Model of TFP.” Review	of	Economic	
Studies 73(4): 983–1007.
Lani, I. 2013. Organize	Ourselves!	Young	Workers	and	the	Union	of	
the	Fissured	Workplace. Editori internazionali riuniti.
Lazear, Edward P. 1990. “Job Security Provisions and Employ-
ment.” Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics 105(3): 699–726.
Naticchioni, Paolo, Michele Raitano, and Claudia Vittori. 2016. “La 
Meglio Gioventu` Earnings Gaps across Generations and Skills in 
Italy.” Economia	Politica 33(2): 233–264.
Nickell, Stephen. 1997. “ Unemployment and Labor Market 
Rigidities: Europe versus North America.” Journal	of	Economic	
Perspectives 11(3): 55–74.
Oreopoulos, Philip, Till von Wachter, and Andrew Heisz. 2012. 
“The Short-and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a 
Recession.” American	Economic	Journal:	Applied	Economics 
4(1): 1–29.
Picchio, Matteo. 2008. “Temporary Contracts and Transitions to 
Stable Jobs in Italy.” Labour 22(Special Issue): 147–174.
Rebitzer, James B., and Lowell J. Taylor. 1991. “A Model of Dual 
Labor Markets When Product Demand Is Uncertain.” Quarterly	
Journal	of	Economics 106(4): 1373–1383.
Song, Jae, David J. Price, Faith Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom, and Till 
von Wachter. Forthcoming. “Firming Up Inequality.” Quarterly	
Journal	of	Economics.
Weil, David. 2014. The	Fissured	Workplace. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
